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ABSTRACT
An important result due to Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) is that differential commodity taxation is
not optimal in the presence of an optimal nonlinear income tax (given weak separability of utility
between labor and all consumption goods).  This article demonstrates that their conclusion holds
regardless of whether the income tax is optimal.  In particular, given any commodity tax and income
tax system, differential commodity taxation can be eliminated in a manner that results in a Pareto
improvement.  Also, differential commodity taxation can be proportionally reduced so as to generate
a Pareto improvement.  In addition, for commodity tax reforms that do not eliminate or
proportionally reduce differential taxation, a simple efficiency condition is offered for determining
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Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1976) important article considers the relationship between
income taxation and commodity taxation.
1  Most notably, they prove that the social welfare
optimum entails no differential commodity taxation, assuming that a nonlinear income tax is
optimally employed and that individuals’ utility functions are weakly separably between labor
and commodities (taken together).  This result is of significance because, among other things, it
implies that Ramsey (1927) tax principles – and many implications derived from them, such as
conclusions regarding the taxation of capital – are displaced by qualitatively different guidelines. 
See, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) and Stiglitz (1987).
It is therefore of interest to determine whether the result of Atkinson and Stiglitz holds
even when the income tax may not be optimal.  Standard methods of proof used to characterize
optimal schemes – including those in Atkinson and Stiglitz and related papers – rely on
arguments that are unavailable when not at an optimum, notably, the first-order conditions and
the associated fact that certain effects are second-order when at an optimum.  Furthermore,
commodity tax reforms may well be contemplated in settings in which one does not know
whether the existing income tax is optimal or in which the income tax in fact is not optimal and
reform is infeasible, perhaps for political reasons that prevent changing the extent of
redistribution.
This article demonstrates that the Atkinson and Stiglitz result holds whatever the income
tax is.  Also, a notable feature of the analysis is that the method of proof illuminates the intuition
behind the conclusions in a very direct way, as outlined in section 2.  This method is used in
section 3 to demonstrate that, without regard to the nature of the preexisting income tax, under
weak separability it is possible to eliminate differential commodity taxation in a manner that
produces a Pareto improvement.  That is, for any differential commodity tax and arbitrary
income tax, there exists an alternative regime with no differential commodity taxation and a
different income tax under which everyone is better off.
In section 4, the same technique is used to prove that one can generate a Pareto
improvement for commodity tax reforms that do not eliminate differential taxation but only
reduce it proportionally.  In order to facilitate the analysis, this section introduces a manner of
normalizing differential commodity taxation that allows presentation of a clear, unambiguous
notion of a reform that proportionally reduces (but need not eliminate) commodity tax
differentials.
In section 5, commodity tax reforms that do not proportionally reduce or fully eliminate
differential taxation are considered.  It is demonstrated that a simple efficiency condition – one
that depends only on efficiency in consumption, without regard to labor supply – determines
whether a Pareto improvement is possible (again assuming weak separability).  Concluding2A substantial literature, not relevant to the present investigation, extends Ramsey (1927)
by examining optimal commodity taxation and commodity tax reforms when there is no income
tax.
3Yang and Haller (1993), in contrast to the present investigation, assume that the
nonlinear income tax remains fixed; in addition, they use a surplus measure for welfare rather
than examining Pareto improvements or invoking a social welfare function to assess whether
there is a welfare gain.
4Konishi (1995) introduces numerous assumptions about utility and the preexisting
income tax to guarantee that the optimization problem is locally well-behaved.  He further
assumes (implicitly) that any marginal change in a commodity tax rate can be accompanied by a
change in the income tax schedule that satisfies the revenue constraint and everyone’s incentive
compatibility constraint and also simultaneously redistributes income so that either everyone
gains or everyone loses from the reform.  Using these important assumptions, he shows (as one
might expect) that either a marginal increase or decrease in a commodity tax rate raises
everyone’s welfare, or else that no change is optimal – where the condition for a local optimum
requires that the integrals over the population of all pertinent effects on each type of individual
balance to zero.
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remarks are offered in section 6.
The present article differs from most prior work on optimal commodity taxation in the
presence of a nonlinear income tax because, as noted, prior work focuses on the full optimum, in
which the income tax is taken to be optimal; also, such work does not examine global reforms
but instead considers only whether introducing some differential commodity taxation would
raise welfare.  See, in addition to Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976, 1980), Mirrlees (1976) and
Christiansen (1984).  (Additionally, Deaton (1979) characterizes the restrictions on utility
functions necessary for the Atkinson-Stiglitz  result to hold when the optimal income tax is
linear.
2)  Some attention has also been devoted to commodity taxation with an arbitrary initial
income tax.
3  Most relevant is Konishi (1995), whose technical exploration of local commodity
tax reforms under restrictive assumptions does not set forth the results derived here or offer an
intuitively accessible understanding of the problem.
4
2.  Intuitive Explanation of the Result
It is useful to begin with Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1976) result that no differentiated
commodity taxation is optimal in the presence of an optimal nonlinear income tax, given weak
separability.  The income tax can be used both to raise needed revenue and to redistribute
income.  Why, then, might one want to employ differential commodity taxation?  The motivation
would seem to be to raise revenue or redistribute income with less distortion, specifically of the
labor/leisure decision, than is caused by the income tax.  However, given weak separability,
differential commodity taxation cannot lessen this distortion, but it does introduce distortions in
commodity choices.
Upon examination, this basic intuition does not depend on the assumption that the
preexisting income tax is set optimally.  To be sure, as noted in the introduction, conditions true5It appears that this technique is first employed in Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), in the
context of examining the propriety of distributive adjustments to cost-benefit analysis.  For
further discussion and applications, see Kaplow (1996, 2004).
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at an optimum often do not hold when one deviates from the optimum.  Nevertheless, in the
present context it can be shown that the two problems – the optimal nonlinear income tax
problem, which trades off redistribution and labor supply distortion, and the optimal commodity
tax problem, which involves relative prices of different commodities – are in an important sense
orthogonal to each other.  In particular, commodity tax reform can be isolated from the income
tax, so there is no reason to refrain from maximizing efficiency with regard to the former on
account of shortcomings regarding the latter.
This isolation is accomplished in the proofs in sections 3, 4, and 5 by combining a reform
in commodity taxes that reduces or eliminates the targeted inefficiency – here, distortion in the
relative prices of commodities – with an adjustment of the income tax schedule that keeps
everything else constant – notably, the extent of redistribution and of labor supply distortion. 
Specifically, when one reduces distortionary commodity taxation, one can simultaneously
imagine adjusting the income tax schedule to offset any effects on individuals’ utility at every
level of income.
5  For example, if individuals at a given income level gain from commodity tax
reform because they pay less in commodity taxes and also benefit from adjusting their pattern of
consumption, the income tax at that level of income can be raised by just enough to offset this
utility gain.  When such adjustments are made at every level of income, it turns out that not only
is utility (and thus the distribution of utility) the same – which is true by construction –  but also
labor effort is unaffected (if one makes the weak separability assumption used by Atkinson and
Stiglitz).  It follows that the only net effect of this reform is on revenue.
It remains to be shown that combining seemingly efficient commodity tax reform with
the hypothesized adjustment to the income tax schedule increases revenue.  An increase in fact
occurs because the reduction in distortion of consumption is not a mere transfer but a real
savings in resources that serves to raise individuals’ utilities.  Therefore, the income tax
adjustment, which is defined as that which keeps everyone’s utility constant, must be taxing
away this increase in utility that otherwise would obtain.  Accordingly, the regime that reduces
inefficiencies in commodity taxation and employs an income tax adjustment that keeps utility
constant necessarily yields a surplus.  One can, therefore, construct an actual income tax
adjustment that distributes this surplus to all individuals, generating a Pareto improvement.
On reflection, the feasibility of the aforementioned reform strategy should not be
surprising.  At its core, the Atkinson-Stiglitz result does not depend on whether the existing
income tax schedule is determined optimally, for such optimality only insures that society is
making the appropriate tradeoff of redistribution and labor supply distortion.  If one could hold
the extent of redistribution and labor supply distortion fixed, one expects that reducing
distortions in commodity taxation would raise social welfare.  And if one indeed holds constant
the overall distribution of well-being, then the gain in total welfare is being allocated in part to
each individual, which makes everyone better off.  The analysis to follow formalizes this basic
insight.- 4 -
3.  Elimination of Differential Commodity Taxation
Individuals choose levels of consumption of n commodities, x1, ..., xn, and of labor effort l
to maximize their utility functions u(v(x1, ..., xn),l), where v is a subutility function.  The utility
functions are assumed to be continuously differentiable, strictly concave, increasing in
commodities, and decreasing in labor effort.  This form of the utility function entails what is
referred to as weak separability of labor (or leisure): For a given level of after-income-tax
income, individuals will allocate their disposable income among commodities in the same
manner regardless of the level of labor effort required to earn that level of income.
Individuals earn income wl that depends on their wage (type) w, which has density f(w). 
Commodity prices for good xi (which equal production costs measured in units of income) are pi,
assumed to be greater than zero.  There is a (nonlinear) income tax schedule T(wl) and
commodity taxes on each good xi of Ji (which may be subsidies, in which case they are negative,
but we restrict them so that Ji > -pi, so all net prices are positive).  Individuals thus face net
prices of pi + Ji.
An individual of type w’s budget constraint can be written as
( ) ( )() () , 1 p x wl wl T wl ii i += − ∑ τ
where summations throughout are from i equals 1 to n and the notation xi(wl) denotes the level of
xi chosen by an individual of type w and thus income of wl, where l implicitly refers to the labor
effort of an individual of type w.  The government’s budget constraint is
[] ( ) () ()( ) , 2 Tw l x w l fwd w R ii += ∑ ∫ τ
where R is a given revenue requirement.
The approach is to begin with a differentiated tax system and attempt to construct an
undifferentiated tax system that makes everyone better off.  First, it is useful to define terms.
Differentiated tax system.  A differentiated tax system {J1, ..., Jn}, T(wl) is one for which
there exists i, j such that (pi+Ji)/(pj+Jj) … pi/pj.
In other words, the taxes and subsidies much be such that the price ratio of at least one pair of
goods does not equal its production-cost ratio.
Undifferentiated tax system.  An undifferentiated tax system {J1*, ..., Jn*}, T*(wl) is one
that is not differentiated, i.e., one for which (pi+Ji*)/(pj+Jj*) = pi/pj, for all i, j.
As discussed further in section 4, there are an infinite variety of equivalent ways to
describe any commodity tax - income tax system.  For example, an undifferentiated system can
involve  Ji* = 0, for all i, or instead one could have  Ji* = " pi, for all i, with a corresponding6If two types initially earn the same income (a possibility that could be ruled out with
appropriate assumptions), the same adjustment to the income tax schedule would work for both
types due to the weak separability assumption.
7It is not asserted at this point that the tax schedule T°(wl) is feasible; in Lemma 2, it will in fact be
shown to generate a surplus.  For purposes of the analysis, it is simply a hypothetical, intermediate construct.  Only the
final schedule, T*(wl), needs to be feasible.
8It is straightforward that one could define an intermediate income tax sufficiently high
that an individual’s utility would be below what it is under the initial regime; consider a level of
income tax that leaves the individual with insufficient funds to purchase the lowest of the initial
xi’s if the price were the lowest of the pi’s.  Likewise, one could set an intermediate income tax
sufficiently low to guarantee that the individual’s utility would be above what it is under the
initial regime; consider a level of tax that leaves the individual with sufficiently great funds to
purchase each commodity at a level above the highest of the initial xi’s if the prices on all
commodities equalled the highest of the pi’s.  Since both levels of income tax, guaranteeing a
lower and a higher utility level than in the initial regime, are possible, by continuity there will
exist an intermediate level of income tax that can be imposed at the given income level such that
the individual’s utility will be the same as it is in the initial regime.  And this is possible for all
income levels, wl(w).
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adjustment to the income tax schedule.  For example, if " > 0, everyone pays proportionally
more for any commodity vector; hence, the income tax schedule can be reduced so that
everyone’s after-income-tax income is greater by the same proportion.  Note that this composite
adjustment to the commodity tax - income tax system is revenue neutral; the additional
commodity tax revenue just offsets the reduced income tax revenue.
To begin the construction of a Pareto-improving tax reform, start with an initial,
differentiated regime {J1, ..., Jn}, T(wl).  For simplicity, choose from among the multitude of
equivalent undifferentiated tax systems the one for which Ji* = 0, for all i.  Moving to this
commodity tax vector will tend to change individuals’ utility because they no longer pay
commodity taxes (or receive subsidies) and because, with a new relative price vector, they will
change their consumption vector.  Whatever is the net effect on utility for any type w and given
labor effort l(w), we can now define an intermediate income tax schedule T°(wl) at each income
level so as to offset the net effect on utility.
6  That is, we will examine an income tax schedule
T°(wl) that has the property that, if all individuals (of every type w) continue to choose the same
level of labor effort l(w) as under the initial tax system, then their utility will be unchanged.
7 
(Whether individuals will choose the same labor effort under this intermediate regime is the
subject of Lemma 1, below.)  That it is possible to construct such an income tax schedule for
each income level is due to the continuity of utility in income.
8
Observe that this intermediate income tax schedule T°(wl) has the property that it leaves
subutility v unaffected for all levels of income (again, continuing to assume that labor effort is
unchanged).  That is, stated in reduced form, v(wl) = v°(wl) for all wl.  This result about the
subutility functions must be true because the income tax schedule is constructed such that
u(v(wl),l) = u°(v°(wl), l); because the u function does not change and l is assumed to be constant,
it must be that the levels of subutility are unchanged.  (Changing each of commodity taxes and- 6 -
the income tax schedule in general alters the level of subutility v produced by a given level of
income wl; however, under the stated assumptions, these effects must be offsetting.)  This
characteristic of the intermediate income tax schedule T°(wl) can be employed to establish the
following result.
Lemma 1: Every type of individual w chooses the same level of labor effort l(w) under
{J1*, ..., Jn*}, T°(wl) as under {J1, ..., Jn}, T(wl).
Proof:  Consider an individual of any type w.  Under the initial regime, the level of labor
effort, l(w), selected is that which maximizes utility.  Under the intermediate regime with income
tax schedule T°(wl), it was just shown that, for any level of income wl, and thus for any choice of
l, the subutility v° under the intermediate regime precisely equals the subutility v under the initial
regime.  This in turn implies that u(l(w)) = u°(l(w)) for all l(w), where the reduced form u(l(w))
refers to the level of utility achieved for any choice of l by the given type w.  Now, since utility
as a function of labor effort is precisely the same under the new, intermediate regime as it is
under the initial regime, it follows that whatever l(w) maximizes u(l(w)) also maximizes u°(l(w)). 
Q.E.D.
The next question is how revenue compares between the initial regime and the
intermediate regime.
Lemma 2: Regime {J1*, ..., Jn*}, T°(wl) (with undifferentiated taxes Ji* = 0, for all i)
raises more revenue than regime {J1, ..., Jn}, T(wl).
Proof: The strategy will be to show that no individuals under the intermediate regime
{J1*, ..., Jn*}, T°(wl) can still afford the consumption vector purchased under the initial regime
{J1, ..., Jn}, T(wl), and that the only way this can be true is if each pays more tax (from
commodity taxes and the income tax combined) under the intermediate regime than under the
initial regime.  (Throughout, labor effort of all types will be taken to be the same under the two
regimes, as established in Lemma 1.)
First, suppose that, under the intermediate regime, an individual of some type w can
afford the consumption vector from the initial regime.  Observe that such an individual would
not in fact choose the same consumption vector but rather will choose a different one under the
intermediate regime because of the change in relative prices.  This follows because the
individual’s optimal consumption vector is determined by standard first-order conditions, vi/vj = 
(pi+Ji)/(pj+Jj), for all i, j.  Given the definition of a differentiated tax system, that there exists i, j
such that (pi+Ji)/(pj+Jj) … pi/pj, and the fact that the move to an undifferentiated system (as exists
under the intermediate regime) eliminates the discrepancy between the tax-inclusive price ratio
and the ratio of production costs, at least one of these first-order conditions no longer holds.  As
a consequence, the consumption vector that was optimal initially cannot be optimal under the
hypothesized intermediate regime.  It follows that utility must be higher under the intermediate
regime.  But this is a contradiction because the intermediate regime’s income tax schedule
T°(wl) is constructed to keep every individual’s utility constant.
Second, using the budget constraint (1), the conclusion that no individual in the9This result necessarily holds if individuals’ behavior is continuous.  However, depending
on the shape of the income tax schedule and of individuals’ utility functions, discontinuities are
possible (notably, with a convex tax schedule, some individuals might discontinuously reduce
their labor supply).  Nevertheless, minimal assumptions on the distribution of types is sufficient
to guarantee that, at any level of rebate, such individuals comprise a set of measure zero, so tax
revenue will be continuous and the stated adjustment will be feasible.
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intermediate regime can afford the consumption bundle from the original regime means that
() ( * ) ( ) ( ) , . 3 p x wl wl T wl for all wl iii +> − ° ∑ τ
Recalling that Ji* = 0, for all i, and using the budget constraint (1) for the initial regime to
substitute for 3pixi(wl) on the left side of expression (3), we obtain
( ) () () () ,
() () () , .
4 wl T wl x wl wl T wl or
Tw l T w l x w l f o r a l l w l
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In the second line of expression (4), the left side is an individual’s total tax payments under the
intermediate regime and the right side is total payments under the initial regime.  Because every
type of individual pays more under the intermediate regime, total revenue is higher.  Q.E.D.
To complete the argument, construct T*(wl) from T°(wl) as follows:
() * ( ) ( ) , 5 Tw lT w lc =° −
where c is the positive constant such that the government’s budget constraint (2) is satisfied
using T*(wl).  That is, beginning from T°(wl), we can reduce everyone’s income tax by the same
dollar amount until the budget balances.  Since there is a surplus when the income tax schedule
is set at T°(wl), there are funds from which everyone’s income tax payments can be reduced.  As
this reduction is made, individuals may change their purchases of commodities and labor effort,
but however they choose to do so, their utility will increase (since they have more income and
relative prices are unchanged).  As one continuously increases the rebate, beginning from zero,
at some c > 0 the government’s budget will just balance.  (Note that, as the income tax schedule
is reduced, individuals may reduce labor supply and thus tax revenue may fall, but as long as
there initially is a surplus and behavior is continuous, some net reduction in everyone’s income
tax payments will be possible.
9)
At this point, we have constructed a new income tax schedule, to accompany an
undifferentiated commodity tax schedule, such that every type of individual is strictly better off,
thereby establishing the following result:- 8 -
Proposition 1: For any differentiated tax system {J1, ..., Jn}, T(wl), there exists an
undifferentiated tax system {J1*, ..., Jn*}, T*(wl) that is strictly Pareto superior – i.e.,
u*(w) > u(w), for all w.
4.  Reduction of Differential Commodity Taxation
Most explorations of optimal taxation do not explore the optimality of partial reforms.  If
one relies on properties of the optimum (and in a neighborhood thereof), it may be difficult to
make statements about changes away from the optimum.  The present approach, however, can
readily be adapted to consider partial reforms.
4.1.  Normalization
To deal with partial commodity tax reform, it is helpful to introduce a normalization that
clarifies the relationship among commodity tax vectors and enables a notationally simple
definition of partial reform and proof of the result.  The issue arises because, for any commodity
tax vector and associated income tax schedule, there exists an infinite variety of equivalent
systems.  For example, suppose that one changes all commodity taxes Ji to JiN = 8(pi+Ji)-pi, for
some positive constant 8.  This leaves all relative prices unchanged – i.e., the prices individuals
face are all changed proportionally.  Suppose further that one adjusts the income tax schedule by
an amount that offsets at every income level the changes in commodity tax payments or receipts. 
For example, if 8 = 0.9, income taxes would be raised so as to leave individuals at every income
level with 10% less disposable income.  Such transformations leave individuals’ choices of
commodities and of labor effort unaffected, produce the same level of utility, and generate the
same total tax payments from each individual (and thus in aggregate).
Observe that the use in the proof in section 3 of a scheme in which Ji* = 0, for all i, as the
undifferentiated system was thus merely a matter of convenience; any system with rates in equal
proportion to commodity prices would have sufficed.  However, when attempting even to define
unambiguously a partial reduction of differentiation in commodity taxation, the matter is
somewhat more complicated.  To assist in this process, it is helpful to introduce a particular
normalization, one that maintains the price ratios faced by individuals but results in the
commodity tax system raising no net revenue (implying that there will be both taxes and
subsidies).




N(wl), is a tax system with the following characteristics: 
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The first requirement is that the commodity taxes raise no net revenue.  The second states that
price ratios remain the same.  The third adjusts the income tax schedule, at each level of income,
by the difference in commodity tax payments (subsidy receipts); the result is that, at every level
of income, total tax payments are the same under the normalized tax system as they are under the
original tax system.
If one wishes to construct this normalized system, observe that requirement 2 provides
n-1 independent equations and requirement 1 adds another, allowing one to solve uniquely for
the Ji
N’s.
10  Once this is done, the income tax adjustment specified by requirement 3 can be
computed.  (Note that, once a tax system is normalized, requirement 1 implies that if any Ji
N is
nonzero, the system must be differentiated.)
It should be emphasized that normalizing a tax system has no real effects.  Because
individuals face the same price ratios at any level of income they choose to earn (requirement 2)
and have enough after-income-tax income to just afford their original consumption vector for
any level of earnings (requirement 3), they will all continue to choose the same consumption
vector and level of labor effort.  Furthermore, requirement 3 guarantees that each individual will
make the same tax payments under the normalized system, so total revenue is unaffected.
4.2.  Analysis
Any differentiated tax system can be normalized, as just defined, to produce an
equivalent tax system.  It will be convenient to assume, without loss of generality, in the analysis
that follows that the initial differentiated tax system under consideration is a normalized one (and
the “N” superscripts will be dropped).  The partial tax reform to be considered will be one under
which Ji* = "Ji, for all i, where " 0 (0,1).
If one reviews the derivation in section 3 (implicitly for the special case in which " = 0),
it will be apparent that all of the analysis is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to this proportional
partial move toward an undifferentiated tax system except for the proof of Lemma 2. 
Specifically, one can define the intermediate income tax regime T°(wl) that holds utility constant
if labor effort is constant in the same manner.  Lemma 1 still holds because it only depends on
the properties of T°(wl).  Finally, if Lemma 2 could be established for this more general case
allowing for partial reforms, then the existence of a surplus can be used to complete the proof as
before.- 10 -
Accordingly, let us reconsider Lemma 2, which states that more revenue is raised in the
intermediate regime with T°(wl) than under the initial regime.  The proof used the fact (in
moving from expression (3) to (4) and in interpreting the latter) that individuals’ changes in their
consumption vectors would have no effect on commodity tax revenue because the reform under
consideration had Ji* = 0, for all i.  For a partial reform, individuals’ changes in consumption
will affect commodity tax revenue, so additional analysis is necessary to demonstrate the claim,
which may be restated as follows:
Lemma 2N: Regime {J1*, ..., Jn*}, T°(wl) (with commodity taxes Ji* = "Ji, for all i)
raises more revenue than regime {J1, ..., Jn}, T(wl).
Proof: The proof of Lemma 2 remains valid, mutatis mutandis, through the derivation of
expression (3).  However, because we can no longer use the fact that Ji* = 0, for all i, expression
(4) becomes
() () *() () () , . ′ °+ > + ∑ ∑ 4 T wl x wl T wl x wl for all wl ii i i ττ
Because the second term on the left side of (4N) has xi instead of xi°, the left side cannot be
interpreted as total revenue under the intermediate regime.  However, this expression can still
yield results regarding income tax revenues.  In expression (4N), substitute "Ji for Ji* and
integrate each side over the population of types to yield
( ) () ( ) () ( )
() ( ) () ( ),
() ( ) () ( ),
6 Tw l f w d w x w l f w d w
Tw lfwd w x w lfwd w
or











where the latter version follows because the summations on each side both equal zero due to the
assumption that the Ji’s are normalized (recall requirement 1).  This establishes that income tax
revenue is greater in the intermediate regime than in the initial regime.
It can also be demonstrated that commodity tax revenues are higher in the intermediate
regime – i.e., that they are positive rather than zero.  To prove this, first observe that, for any
type earning a given level of income, the xi°’s produce the same level of total utility as the xi’s
because the intermediate regime was constructed to yield equal utility.  Next, note that, under the
initial tax regime, it must be that the xi°’s cannot be afforded.  (Suppose they could be.  We
know, using the same sort of argument as in the original Lemma 2, that the first-order conditions
for utility maximization would be violated, so an individual would choose a different commodity
vector and achieve higher utility.  But this contradicts the construction of the intermediate
regime, which ensures that utility must be the same.)  From the individual’s budget constraint
(1), this conclusion implies- 11 -
( ) () () , . 7 px px f o r a l l w l ii i ii i +° > + ∑∑ ττ
Solving for wl using the budget constraint (1) for each regime and equating the two yields
() ( ) ( * ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , . 8 T wl p x wl T wl p x wl for all wl iii ii i °+ + °= + + ∑ ∑ ττ
That is, for a given level of income, all of it must be spent on income tax payments and
commodities (producer prices and commodity taxes) in each regime.  Solving (8) for 3pixi° and
substituting this into the left side of (7) gives us
( ) ( )() () () () * ()
() ( ) , .
9 p x wl T wl T wl x wl x wl
px w l f o r a l l w l
ii i i i ii
ii i






Simplifying and rearranging terms, we have
() ( * ) () () () , . 10 ττ iii x wl T wl T wl for all wl −° > ° − ∑
The intuition behind expression (10) is as follows: The left side is the additional commodity tax
burden in the initial regime (versus the intermediate regime) if one were to purchase the
intermediate regime’s commodity tax vector instead.  This added burden must exceed the
amount by which income taxes are lower in the initial regime in order for this commodity vector
to be unaffordable in the initial regime.
To complete the argument, on the left side of (10) we can substitute for Ji using the fact
that Ji* = "Ji and then integrate each side over the population of types to yield








  °> ° − ∫ ∑ ∫∫ ii x w lfw d w T w lfw d w Tw lfw d w
The right side, the difference in income tax revenues, was already proved to be positive (see
expression 6).  Because we are assuming that " 0 (0,1), the first component on the left side is
positive; hence, the summation component must be positive.  That component, in turn, is the
total commodity tax revenue raised in the intermediate regime.  Therefore, it must exceed
commodity tax revenue in the initial regime, which equals zero (because a normalized
commodity tax vector is employed).
The result from expression (6) that income tax revenue is greater in the intermediate
regime combined with the just-obtained result that commodity tax revenue is also greater in that
regime establishes that total revenue is greater in the intermediate regime than in the initial
regime.  Q.E.D.11Using the method of the proof of Proposition 2, one could first normalize the tax system
and then undertake the proportional reduction in differentiation.  Afterward, one could add a
further step, to reverse the initial normalization.  Thus, one could simply reduce the
differentiation without normalizing.  (It should be apparent that the normalization was not
necessary to prove the general claim but rather was only for expositional convenience.)
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As stated above, the remainder of the proof of Proposition 1 follows from this conclusion
as before, so now we can state:
Proposition 2: Beginning with any normalized differentiated tax system {J1, ..., Jn},
T(wl), for any tax reform such that Ji* = "Ji, for all i, where " 0 (0,1), there exists T*(wl) such
that the reform regime is strictly Pareto superior – i.e., u*(w) > u(w), for all w.
Furthermore, for any differentiated tax system that is not normalized one can define an
equivalent normalized tax system, so it follows that one can proportionally reduce the degree of
differentiation in any differentiated tax system in a manner that results in a Pareto
improvement.
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On reflection, it should not be surprising that Lemma 2N could be established and,
accordingly, the result in Proposition 1 could be extended to partial reform of commodity
taxation.  When one begins from a normalized commodity tax system that raises no revenue in
the aggregate and implements a uniform proportional move toward zero, consumption changes
will tend to involve shifts from commodities that were subsidized (but now are subsidized less)
to commodities that were taxed (but now are taxed less), and from lower to higher taxed
commodities (because the tax differential is now less), and from highly to less highly subsidized
commodities (because the subsidy differential is now less).  All such shifts raise additional
revenue.  The argument is not quite so simple because, not having greatly restricted the form of
utility functions, this need not be true with regard to every commodity.  (For example,
purchasing more of a commodity that is taxed might result in a reduction of purchases of some
substitute that is even more heavily taxed.)  In addition, the argument is not immediate because
disposable income differs due to the reform, and again without further restricting utility
functions one cannot rule out shifts in the commodity vector that may have revenue-reducing
effects.  The analysis of Lemma 2N establishes, however, that the intuitively expected tendency is
indeed correct in the aggregate, which is all that is necessary to prove the more general
proposition.
5.  Other Reforms of Differential Commodity Taxation
The partial commodity tax reforms encompassed by Proposition 2 have a proportional,
uniform character.  Obviously, many other partial reforms could also result in Pareto
improvements.  The reason for the restriction in the proposition is that otherwise it is difficult
even to define unambiguously what a reduction in differentiation means.  For example, if there
where three commodities, two taxed at 10% and the third untaxed, would moving one of the 10%- 13 -
rates to 8% be a reduction in differentiation?  Distortion would be reduced between the
commodity for which the tax rate is reduced and the untaxed commodity, but distortion would be
introduced between the two taxed commodities.  Accordingly, one cannot say a priori whether
overall distortion would be reduced.  Suppose, however, that one could determine for a given
commodity tax reform whether distortion in consumption – in a simple, traditional sense – was
reduced.  Would that be sufficient for a Pareto improvement to be possible given an arbitrary
income tax and the existence of labor supply distortion?  With weak separability, it turns out that
the answer is affirmative.
Begin with any differentiated tax system {J1, ..., Jn}, T(wl) and consider any commodity
tax reform Ji*.  As in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2, define an intermediate regime with
income tax schedule T°(wl) that has the property that, if all individuals (of every type w)
continue to choose the same level of labor effort l(w) as under the initial tax system, then their
utility will be unchanged.
First observe that Lemma 1, stating that labor effort is indeed unchanged, once again
holds because the analysis depends only on the manner in which T°(wl) is constructed (and weak
separability).  Let us now define a broader set of commodity tax reforms that are of interest.
Efficiency-increasing commodity tax reform.  For any tax system {J1, ..., Jn}, T(wl), a
commodity tax reform {J1*, ..., Jn*} is efficiency increasing if, when combined with the income
tax schedule T°(wl):
() () ( ) () ( ). 12 p x wl f w dw p x wl f w dw ii ii °< ∫ ∑ ∫ ∑
Expression (12) states that the total real resource cost of everyone’s consumption vectors in the
intermediate regime is less than the total real resource cost in the initial regime.  Because
everyone’s utility is the same in these two regimes, this condition indicates that the intermediate
regime is more efficient with regard to consumption choices in a narrow, conventional sense –
i.e., when concerns with the labor/leisure distortion and distortionary income taxation are
ignored.
Given an efficiency-increasing commodity tax reform, it is straightforward to show that a
version of Lemma 2 holds.
Lemma 2O: Any efficiency-increasing commodity tax reform {J1*, ..., Jn*}, T°(wl) (with
taxes Ji* such that (12) holds) raises more revenue than regime {J1, ..., Jn}, T(wl).
Proof: For each of the budget constraints (1) for these two regimes, integrate them over
the population of types, subtract one from the other, and rearrange terms, to yield:12It might appear that Proposition 3 is more general than the first two propositions and
therefore subsumes them; however, this is not the case.  An analogue to Lemma 2 is indeed easy
to establish for an efficiency-increasing commodity tax reform, but the full analysis of Lemma 2
or Lemma 2N, as the case may be, is necessary to show that expression (12) holds for the
elimination or reduction of differential commodity taxation.  In essence, demonstrating that total
tax revenue is greater under the intermediate regime and demonstrating that fewer productive
resources are utilized amount to the same thing.  (One might describe expression (13) as a sort of
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The first bracketed term on the left side of expression (13) is total revenue under the intermediate
regime and the second bracketed term is total revenue under the initial regime.  The right side is
positive according to expression (12), the definition of an efficiency-increasing commodity tax
reform.  Q.E.D.
Accordingly, we can complete the argument as before, which establishes: 
Proposition 3: Beginning with any tax system {J1, ..., Jn}, T(wl), for any efficiency-
increasing commodity tax reform Ji*, there exists T*(wl) such that the reform regime is strictly
Pareto superior – i.e., u*(w) > u(w), for all w.
In essence, Proposition 3 states that if a commodity tax reform increases efficiency in a
traditional sense – i.e., if it increases surplus in a world in which labor supply is constant,
tantamount to a world with fixed labor supply or simply one in which initial wealth endowments
are given – then the reform will be desirable, indeed strictly Pareto improving, when combined
with an appropriate income tax adjustment, even in a world in which labor supply is not constant
and there exists a distortionary labor income tax.
The intuition behind this result parallels the analysis just presented: If a commodity tax
reform increases efficiency, this means that fewer resources are needed for individuals to achieve
their initial levels of utility.  Because individuals thus do not need to spend as much (aside from
commodity taxes) in the hypothesized intermediate regime, total tax collections must be greater
for given income levels, and the resulting surplus can be distributed in a manner that yields a
Pareto improvement.  Furthermore, when the income tax is adjusted in a manner that
accomplishes this, labor supply effects do not interfere with the argument.  This final Proposition
therefore reinforces the sense in which the commodity tax problem and the income tax problem
can be viewed as independent (given the assumption of weak separability).
1213To verify the distributional characteristics of the reform as a whole, observe first that
T°(wl) is constructed such that, in combination with the reform of differential commodity
taxation, everyone’s utility is held constant, and the final income tax schedule T*(wl) is
constructed from T°(wl) by subtracting a constant, as indicated by expression (5).
14See, for example, Cremer, Pestieau, and Rochet (2001), Marchand, Pestieau, and
Racionero (2003), Mirrlees (1976), Naito (1999), and Saez (2002, 2004).
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6.  Conclusion
Differential commodity taxation distorts individuals’ consumption choices and thus is
presumptively inefficient.  However, in second-best settings, such presumptions may be
overcome.  Nevertheless, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) show that, when there is present a
nonlinear income tax that is set optimally, the presumption holds: Differential commodity
taxation is indeed inefficient.  The explanation for the result is that the other relevant distortion
involves labor supply, and when weak separability is assumed, commodity taxes offer no
leverage for lessening that distortion.
The present analysis extends Atkinson and Stiglitz’s result in three ways.  First, it shows
that, without regard to the optimality of the preexisting income tax, one can always eliminate
differential commodity taxation in a manner that produces a Pareto improvement.  Second, it
shows that a Pareto improvement is likewise possible for any partial reform of commodity
taxation that proportionally reduces but does not eliminate differential taxation.  Third, with
regard to commodity tax reforms that do not proportionally reduce or eliminate differential
taxation, it offers a simple efficiency condition for determining whether a Pareto improvement is
possible.
The framework for these results, like that of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), employs weak
separability.  In addition, the approach makes the intuition transparent by using an income tax
adjustment that holds the extent of redistribution and the labor/leisure distortion constant, so in
essence the only remaining effects are the narrow efficiency consequences of commodity tax
reform.  Finally, because the income tax adjustment employed in demonstrating the possibility of
a Pareto improvement – in combination with commodity tax reform – has the characteristic of
being distribution neutral, such a reform strategy may possess some political plausibility as
well.
13
Numerous qualifications to Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1976) result are familiar from their
article and from other literature on optimal commodity taxation in the presence of an optimally
determined nonlinear income tax.
14  Most notably, the assumption of leisure separability rules
out the possibility that differential commodity taxation might help to offset the labor/leisure
distortion from the income tax.  Without separability, it might be possible to tax complements to
leisure and to subsidize complements to labor, improving efficiency by reducing the labor/leisure
distortion.  (Formally, relaxing this assumption would affect Lemma 1: If, instead of being
unaffected by the intermediate reform, labor supply were increased (reduced), the reform would
be more (less) favorable than otherwise because of the additional positive (negative) effect on- 16 -
tax revenue.)  Because this qualification and most others associated with the Atkinson and
Stiglitz result would seem to have a similar effect on the present analysis as on that which
assumes an optimal income tax, it does not appear useful to pursue such matters further here.- 17 -
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